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An irony of the age of reproductive technology is that genes have 
gained symbolic importance and legal weight at the same time that 
we have acquired the ability to manipulate, alter, and exchange them. 
One manifestation of genes’ increased importance is the increasing 
commitment—again, in both law and culture—to genes as the 
essence, the sine qua non, the definitional element of parenthood. This 
commitment, which I refer to as genetic essentialism,1 has proceeded 
apace despite, and in seeming contradiction with, the commodification 
of reproduction, complete with markets in eggs and sperm. Neoliberal 
culture, however, does not necessarily register degradation when genes 
are bought and sold. Markets, competition, and high prices confirm 
rather than diminish value, if not of the genes themselves than of the 
owners. To be a parent is increasingly defined as having either 
produced the gametes or paid for them. “Genetic essentialism” thus 
refers primarily to the definition of parenthood in terms of genes, but 
it also encompasses genes’ alienability and the consequent fungibility. 
Lost in these developments are definitions of parenthood on terms 
other than genes and contract. My particular concern is the sidelining 
of gestation as a fundamental form of parenthood. Peruse the legal 
literature and you will find the term “biological parent” used almost 
 
† Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Juvenile and Family Law 
Program at University of Colorado Law School. 
1. Cf. Leslie Bender, Genes, Parents, and Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies: ARTs, Mistakes, Sex, Race, and Law, 12 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 1, 4 (2003) (“Genetic essentialism asserts that our genes 
and our DNA are the essence, the core, the most important constituent 
part of who we are as human beings; therefore genetics should 
overpower any other factor when defining biological parenthood. Genetic 
essentialism reduces human beings to the contents of our cells. It ignores 
the ways our cells and environments interrelate, the ways our 
physiological system functions as a whole organism, and the ways our 
minds and hearts affect our being. Additionally, genetic 
essentialism renders all our ways of nurturing and being nurtured by one 
another for naught.”). 
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exclusively as a synonym for “genetic parent,” as if biology required 
no more than an egg and a sperm to pop a child into existence.2 
This essay explores some of the costs of relying on genetic 
essentialism in family law. It first critiques proposals to adopt genetic 
essentialism in its strongest form: mandatory genetic testing of every 
child at birth, with genes defining parenthood unless a contract says 
otherwise. The essay then suggests an alternative way of thinking 
about biological parenthood, less as proposal than as counterweight, 
demonstrating that the choice of genetic essentialism is ideological, 
not scientific, and that it carries with it substantial costs. 
I. Mandatory Genetic Parenthood? 
Many legal scholars have argued that parenthood should be 
defined in terms of genes, but the most extended case for mandatory 
genetic testing comes from Mary Pat Byrn and Jeannette Ives in their 
article Which Came First, the Parent or the Child?3 Byrn and Ives 
 
2. See R. Alto Charo, Biological Determinism in Legal Decision Making: 
The Parent Trap, 3 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 265, 293 n. 149 (2004) (“A 
majority of American courts, newspapers, and academic commentators 
already use ‘natural’ or ‘biological’ when referring to the ‘genetic’ 
mother. [examples omitted…] This should not be surprising because 
many of these judges and commentators are men whose only possible 
biological links are genetic.”). See, e.g., William J. Giacomo & Angela 
DiBiasi, Mommy (and Daddy) Dearest, 87 N.Y. STATE BAR J. 18, 18 
(2015) (“By this surrogacy arrangement, the egg donor and Sherri 
Shepherd’s husband are the biological parents—they each have a genetic 
tie to the resulting child.”); Charles P. Kindregan & Danielle White, 
International Fertility Tourism: The Potential for Stateless Children in 
Cross-Border Commercial Surrogacy Arrangements, 36 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 527, 550 (2013) (referring to “genetic (biological) 
parents”); Rebecca Mae Salokar, Gay and Lesbian Parenting in Florida: 
Family Creation Around the Law, 4 F.I.U. L. REV. 473, 492 n. 121 
(2009) (“The biological parent is one who is genetically related to the 
child as a result of conception using that person’s egg or sperm.”); Usha 
Rengachary Smerdon, Crossing Bodies, Crossing Borders: International 
Surrogacy Between the United States and India, 39 CUMB. L. REV. 15, 
35 (2008) (referring to “genetic (biological) parents”); Anthony Miller, 
Baseline, Bright-Line, Best Interests: A Pragmatic Approach for 
California to Provide Certainty in Determining Parentage, 34 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 637, 698–99 (2003) (referring to “genetic-biological 
parents” in contrast to “surrogate” mothers). But see Duane R. Valz, 
Review of Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive 
Technologies, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 201, 207 (1995) (“In theory, for 
example, a child could end up with three biological parents (a genetic 
mother, genetic father, and a gestational mother.”). 
3. Mary Patricia Byrn & Jenni Vainik Ives, Which Came First, the Parent 
or the Child?, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 305, 338–39 (2010); see also June 
Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the Parent—
Child Relationship in an Age of Genetic Uncertainty, 11 WM. & MARY 
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make powerful arguments based on the best interests of children.4 A 
regime of mandatory testing, however, would face substantial 
practical problems, which in turn point to defects in the ideology of 
genetic essentialism.5 
Having echoed in their title the classic chicken-or-egg question, 
Byrn & Ives answer their own question by concluding that the child 
comes first, then the parent.6 This answer treats the child’s existence 
as a fact while treating “parent” as a status assigned by law.7 To be a 
child is merely to exist as a young human being—it can be done in 
isolation—while being a parent inherently consists of being in relation 
to another person, the child; parenthood entails rights and 
responsibilities toward children, created by operation of law, while 
childhood is merely the early phase of life. The child thus “comes 
first,” existentially or at least legally alone. 
Because the child is alone, Byrn and Ives argue that the state, as 
parens patriae, has a constitutional duty to provide for the child’s 
care and rearing.8 It does so through the legal category “parent.” 
They further conclude that the people most likely to act in the child’s 
best interests—and thus the people whom the state is obligated to 
recognize as legal parents—are the genetic parents of a child 
conceived through sexual intercourse and the intended parents of a 
child conceived through alternative reproductive technology.9 A 
 
L. REV. 1011, 1067–70 (2003) (proposing mandatory paternity testing, 
with limited waivers, at birth). 
4. Byrn & Ives, supra note 3, at 322–24. 
5. I use ideology in the sense of a guiding narrative, a sense which is not 
necessarily derogatory. The alternative narrative of reproduction that I 
outline below is also an ideology. Cf. STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY, Law and ideology (“Ideology refers, in a general sense, to a 
system of political ideas.”). 
6. Byrn & Ives, supra note 3, at 342. 
7. Id. at 307. 
8. Id. at 324–27. 
9. Id. at 343. Of course, the attribution of parental status is not based 
solely on the “best interests of the child,” the familiar test for custodial 
determinations in family law. There are other policies at stake, and the 
child’s interests are only one piece. Moreover, the child is not entitled to 
the best possible parents. When Byrn and Ives argue that the state 
must assign as parents the “people most likely” to look out for the 
child’s best interests, id. at 342-43, they do not suggest an individual 
evaluation of a person’s potential merits as a parent to a particular 
child. Rather, the state must assign parenthood according to a rule that 
in most cases is likely to identify parents who have the child’s interests 
at heart. Thus, we assign parenthood in part according to our beliefs 
about the factual circumstances that would cause an adult to have a 
special feeling toward a particular child. These beliefs connect to 
cultural norms. Specifically, we have cultural norms that genetics, 
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genetic definition serves the best interests of children, they say, 
because as a general rule people are interested in the welfare of their 
genetic offspring.10 In the context of reproductive technology, 
“intended parents” refers to the people intended at the time of 
conception; they would be identified in the contracts governing any 
arrangements for surrogacy or donated gametes.11 Because they have 
gone to the considerable effort and expense required to reproduce 
using technology, they too can be trusted to protect the welfare of the 
resulting children.12 
Byrn & Ives intend these measures to provide each child with 
legal parents as quickly and permanently as possible. They do not 
want children left in legal limbo for the duration of a legal process to 
determine parentage.13 They also want to avoid cases in which the 
parental status assumed by the adults at the time of the birth is 
questioned later in the child’s life, such as when a husband discovers 
years later that he is not the genetic father.14 In order to ensure 
accomplishment of these goals, Byrn & Ives propose that we should 
not only define parenthood in terms genes but also institute 
mandatory testing, for all children born as a result of sexual 
intercourse, to make certain that each child is assigned the correct 
parents at birth.15  
 
gestation, and use of reproductive technology to create a child all give 
rise to a duty toward the child and ought to kindle affection and a sense 
of duty in the heart of the parent. Because the potential parents will in 
most cases subscribe to the same cultural norm, we can anticipate that 
assigning parenthood on these bases will generally result in choosing a 
parent who is motivated to do right by the child. In addition, reliance 
on a biological connection serves the pluralist interest in insulating the 
distribution of children from state control. 
10. Id. at 330. 
11. Id. at 341-42. 
12. Id. at 342. 
13. Id. at 332. 
14. Id.  at 339. For further discussion of such cases, see generally Brandon 
James Hoover, Establishing the Best Answer to Paternity 
Disestablishment, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 145, 161 (2011); Melanie B. 
Jacobs, My Two Dads: Disaggregating Biological and Social Paternity, 
38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809, 840 (2006) [hereinafter Jacobs, My Two Dads]; 
Melanie B. Jacobs, When Daddy Doesn’t Want to Be Daddy Anymore: 
An Argument Against Paternity Fraud Claims, 16 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 193 (2004) [hereinafter Jacobs, When Daddy]; Niccol D. 
Kording, Little White Lies That Destroy Children’s Lives: Recreating 
Paternity Fraud Laws to Protect Children’s Interests, 6 J. L. & FAM. 
STUD. 237, 238 (2004). 
15. Byrn & Ives, supra note 3, at 338–39. 
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A regime of mandatory testing, however, would face problems of 
consent, consequences, and error that should give us pause. 
On the question of consent, the state has the power to compel 
medical treatment of a child, but that power is not carte blanche to 
require medical procedures on a child.16 Moreover, one cannot simply 
perform a test on the child to identify the parents; one needs blood 
from the potential parents as well. Holding parental rights hostage in 
order to compel consent to the blood draws would raise serious 
constitutional questions. While courts today sometimes compel DNA 
testing, they can do so only on the basis of some other evidence of 
either criminal guilt or denied paternity, coupled with refusal to fulfill 
the responsibilities of that status.17 Even in the happy afterglow of a 
successful birth, more than a few people are likely to have qualms 
about state-mandated collection of DNA samples on such a massive 
scale. 
Suppose, however, that we have identified candidates for 
parenthood and they have consented to the tests. Now suppose the 
lab reports back that the presumed father is not a match for the 
child. Why might that happen? Perhaps the mother conceived with 
another man; perhaps, after being unable to conceive, she obtained 
donated sperm in secret to protect his ego.18 Reasonable people 
disagree about whether the child’s (or parents’) interests are served 
by forcing this information into the open.19 But there is another 
 
16. See generally B. Jessie Hill, Whose Body? Whose Soul? Medical 
Decision-Making on Behalf of Children and the Free Exercise Clause 
Before and After Employment Division v. Smith, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1857, 1875-77 (2011) (arguing that states should be more willing to 
compel treatment and that the parental reliance on free exercise claims 
to refuse treatment on behalf of a child may be unfounded). 
17. See, e.g., State v. Graham, 318 N.W.2d 853, 855-56 (Minn. 1982) 
(upholding statute that provide for compulsory blood tests in paternity 
actions because it was not an unwarranted exercise of police power or a 
violation of substantive due process, the right to privacy, or the right of 
bodily integrity); In re Paternity of D.A.A.P., 344 N.W.2d 200, 202 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that a court may order an alleged father 
to submit to a blood test only after determining at a pretrial hearing 
that there is a probability that paternity can be established and that a 
determination of paternity in in the best interests of the child); S.S. v. 
E.S., 578 A.2d 381, 386-87 (N.J. App. Div. 1990), aff’d 590 A.2d 1188 
(1991) (holding that the court is required to order a blood test if the 
plaintiff shows an articulable reason for suspecting that the defendant is 
the father of the child). 
18. Of course, implementation of mandatory testing would affect the 
likelihood of either happening in the first place, especially the latter. 
19. Compare Byrn & Ives, supra note 3, at 330 (seeking to prevent 
protracted legal disputes about parentage) with Jacobs, My Two Dads, 
supra note 14, at 837–38 (“[B]iology alone should not disestablish 
parentage, but rather, functional parenthood should suffice as the 
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category of likely explanation: error. DNA tests are widely perceived 
as infallible, but they are susceptible to multiple kinds of human and 
inherent error.20 Samples get contaminated or swapped in the lab, and 
criteria for a match are based on statistics, which means that there is 
an inherent probabilistic element. While the error rate is low, even a 
very small percentage of a very large number is itself a large number. 
Massive genetic testing of infants would subject some couples to the 
pain of being presented with scientific claims of deceit where in fact 
none occurred. At a minimum, any state considering a testing 
program should take a hard look at the probable numbers of both 
false positives and false negatives. 
Errors can complicate the identification of not only paternity but 
also maternity. In 2002, a woman in Washington spent sixteen 
months under suspicion of welfare fraud and perhaps of kidnapping 
when repeated genetic testing showed her not to be the parent of her 
three children.21 Resolution came only after doctors tested a new 
infant immediately after watching her give birth; that child, too, was 
not “hers” genetically. In our universal testing regime, we might 
conclude that she was a contracted surrogate on the run, trying to 
keep a baby who wasn’t “really hers.” In fact, this mother was a 
chimera: her eggs contained one set of DNA inherited from her own 
parents, while her blood contained a different set.22 
 
predicate for a legal parentage determination.”); Jacobs, When Daddy, 
supra note 14, at 234-35 (proposing a short statute of limitations for 
challenges to paternity); Kording, supra note 14, at 266 (arguing that 
genetic testing should be prohibited if a father-child relationship has 
been established but mandatory if it has not). 
20. For a discussion of human errors in DNA matching, see W.C. Thomson 
et al., How the Probability of a False Positive Affects the Value of DNA 
Evidence, 48 J. Forensic Sci. 47, 47 (2003). For a discussion of errors 
arising from comparisons across massive databases, see David H. Kaye, 
Trawling DNA Databases for Partial Matches: What is the FBI Afraid 
Of?, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 145, 170 (2009).  
21. Graham Noble, Pregnancy No Proof of Motherhood; Woman Was Her 
Own Twin—and the Twin Was the Mother of Her Children, LIBERTY 
VOICE (Jan. 26, 2014), http://guardianlv.com/2014/01/pregnancy-no-
proof-of-motherhood-woman-was-her-own-twin-and-the-twin-was-the-
mother-of-her-children/ (last visited 8/1/15). See also Evonne Lack, 
Strange But True: One Person Born with Two Sets of DNA (a 
chimera), BABYCENTER BLOG, http://www.babycenter.com/0_strange-
but-true-one-person-born-with-two-sets-of-dna-a-chim_10364937.bc (last 
visited 8/1/15) (discussing persons with multiple sets of DNA). 
22. Chimerism can occur when the fetus swaps genes with either the mother 
or a twin, or when one twin is absorbed into the other. Lack, supra note 
21. 
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Biology, then, is not as tidy as genetic essentialism assumes; and 
arguably, neither are people’s family lives. Genetic essentialism 
assumes that relationships are made up of discrete categories: parent 
or child, chicken or egg, a genetic tie that either is or is not, a fetus 
that either is or is not a separate individual from the pregnant 
woman. On the question of the status of the fetus, genetic 
essentialism prompts an answer to the question of when separate life 
begins: at the time of conception. By defining the new child in terms 
of a set of genes, genetic essentialism suggests the model that 
currently underlies anti-abortion ideology: that an embryo exists as a 
new, independent human being as soon as conception occurs. As Reva 
Siegel documented, the notion of the embryo and fetus as a distinct 
individual suspended—even trapped—inside the pregnant woman was 
a foundation of the nineteenth-century campaign to criminalize 
abortion.23 Today’s abortion opponents continue to proclaim as a 
scientific fact that life begins at conception.24 They insist that the 
combination of chromosomes created at conception is the essence of 
an individual human being, who needs only the opportunity to unfold 
over the course of nine months’ gestation.25 This theory of 
reproduction “systematically discount[s] women’s role in reproducing 
life.”26 More broadly, this ideology underlies the conflict model of 
pregnancy that has brought us the medical theory of “maternal–fetal 
conflict” and the assumption that the conflict is between two distinct 
individuals, the mother and the fetus.27 
 
23.  Reva B. Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: An Historical Perspective on 
Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. 
REV. 261, 288-89 (1992). 
24. See, e.g., Robert John Araujo, Abortion—From Privacy to Equality: 
The Failure of the Justifications for Taking Hunan Life, 45 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1737, 1785, 1789 (2009); Charles I. Lugosi, Conforming to the Rule 
of Law: When Person and Human Being Finally Mean the Same Thing 
in Fourteenth Amendment Jurisprudence, 22 ISSUES L. & MED. 119, 123 
(2006). 
25. I discuss this continuity between preformationism and modern anti-
abortion rhetoric at greater length in Jennifer S. Hendricks, Not Of 
Woman Born: A Scientific Fantasy, 62 CASE WESTERN RESERVE L. 
REV. 399, 428–32 (2011). 
26. Siegel, supra note 23, at 291. 
27. As I have previously outlined, “such a conflict is in one sense inherent in 
every pregnancy. From the perspective of genes (rather than people), 
the fetus’s genes “want” to use as much of the mother’s physiological 
resources as they can, while the mother’s genes “want” to invest 
appropriately in this potential offspring but also to preserve resources 
for existing and possible future children. The same conflict of interest 
exists, however, with respect to any particular ovum or sperm, each of 
which contains genes that “want” to be reproductively successful. A 
person who uses birth control or seeks an abortion is making a decision 
not to create a child at a particular time in order to conserve resources 
 
Health Matrix · Volume 26·Issue 1·2016  
Genetic Essentialism in Family Law 
116 
This theory of conflict—of the woman and fetus as distinct 
individuals—predates genetic essentialism in its modern form. 
Eighteenth-century preformationists originally believed: 
that the form of the fetus was contained within the mother’s egg 
and that the father’s semen provided the trigger to stimulate growth. 
It followed that an egg contained a series of Russian nesting dolls, 
with all the generations of humanity contained originally in Eve’s 
eggs. This “ovist” view of reproduction, however, was “almost 
uniformly rejected” once sperm was observed and recognized as the 
male analogue to the egg. The pre-existing fetus was quickly 
transferred to the sperm. A famous eighteenth-century illustration of 
the preformationist view depicts a tiny man squatting in the head of a 
sperm, his own head either replaced by or enclosed in an oversized 
bulge. This small creature was believed to take root and grow in the 
mother “just as the seed does in the field.”28 
The assumption that the pre-fetus resided in the sperm rather 
than the egg was based on an axiom adopted by Erasmus Darwin 
(grandfather of Charles): he found it unacceptable that women could 
play a greater role in reproduction than men; since the woman 
provided the food and nurturance of the growing fetus, it must be 
that man provided the original form of the new individual.29 
Far from being invented out of whole cloth, genetic essentialism 
was an adaption of this preformationist view in response to the 
discovery of DNA in both eggs and sperm.30 The presence of DNA in 
 
(in a very broad sense of the word) for herself and for her family, 
including existing and future children.” Hendricks, supra note 25, at 435 
(citing RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 128–29 (30th anniversary 
ed. 2006), and Leslie Cannold, Women, Ectogenesis, and Ethical 
Theory, in ECTOGENESIS: ARTIFICIAL WOMB TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
FUTURE OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION 50, 54 (Scott Gelfand & John R. 
Shook, eds., 2006) (describing a study participant’s expression of the 
view that abortion is a moral decision based on “an evaluation that 
continuing the pregnancy would harm her maternal/fetal-child unit”). 
Cf. Rivka M. Weinberg, Identifying and Dissolving the Non-Identity 
Problem, 137 PHILOS. STUD. 3, 4 (“Future people matter a great deal, 
but merely possible people don’t matter at all.”), 7 (“[E]xistence per se 
is not an interest that future people have, especially since nonexistence 
is not an alternative for them.”), 13–16; I. Glenn Cohen, Regulating 
Reproduction: The Problem With Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. 423, 
439 (2011) (agreeing with general view that “‘no one is harmed in not 
being created’”) (quoting F.M. Kamm, Cloning and Harm to Offspring, 
4 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & POL’Y 65, 72 (2000)). 
28. Hendricks, supra note 25, at 420 (citing and quoting Nancy Tuana, The 
Weaker Seed: The Sexist Bias of Reproductive Theory, 3 HYPATIA 35, 
52–54 (1988)). 
29. See id. 
30. See Hendricks, supra note 25, at 421–22; Jane Maienschein, Cloning and 
Stem Cell Debates in the Context of Genetic Determinism, 9 YALE J. 
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eggs proved that mothers contributed equally the genetic “blueprint.” 
Today, this belief in equal contribution fits comfortably with a 
superficial commitment to sex equality. Historically, genetic 
essentialism emerged as a somewhat grudging acknowledgement that 
women are as important to reproduction as men. Note, however, that 
“equal” contributions have been achieved only by ignoring what 
Erasmus Darwin saw: that women quite clearly contribute more than 
men in other, non-genetic capacities. Redefining genes as the essence 
of parenthood enabled society to define men and women as equals by 
counting only what men do, then admitting (eventually) that women 
do that too. 
In fact, the ideological nature of our current commitment to 
genetic essentialism is illustrated by the fact that it, too, overstates 
the male contribution to reproduction. Even if we only care about 
genes, mothers and fathers are not equal. Both contribute nuclear 
DNA for the child, but the mother also contributed mitochondrial 
DNA and therefore has a greater initial role in the genetic makeup of 
the embryo.31 In addition, even after the initial package of 
chromosomes is fixed, decisions about how the child’s genes will be 
expressed are made throughout gestation (and beyond), so the 
mother’s contribution to the child’s genetic makeup continues.32 
This persistent understatement even of the genetic role played by 
mothers, combined with its roots in preformationism, is why I 
consider genetic essentialism and its supposed sex equality to be 
merely the modern mask of a claim to paternal supremacy. By 
fixating on genes, genetic essentialism limits the scope of the role of 
“parent” to the parts of that role that men can play. Even then it 
must disregard evidence that women do more, even of what men do. 
Given the obvious difference between women’s and men’s biological 
role in reproduction, it is quite an accomplishment to tell a story—
and continue to adapt that story to hundreds of years of scientific 
discoveries while keeping the basic message the same—that teaches 
that the male role is more substantial or important, or even equal to 
the female. 
 
HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 565, 574-75 (2009) (discussing “the 
preformism of genetic determinism”). As discussed above, preformation 
had sufficient hold on popular imagination in the United States to play 
a role in the criminalization of abortion in the nineteenth century. See 
supra, text accompanying notes 23, 26 (referring to Reva Siegel’s 
historical analysis of the criminalization campaign). 
31. See W. Nicholson Price, Note, Am I My Son? Human Clones and the 
Modern Family, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 119, 142–43 
(2010) (discussing mitochondrial DNA and explaining that, “contrary to 
common belief, DNA exists in the cell outside the nucleus.”). 
32. See Hendricks, supra note 25, at 424.  
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II. A Different Story 
Genetic essentialism is a story about biology, the current 
incarnation of a story that has adapted over time to new scientific 
discoveries but remains rooted in ideology, not science, as its starting 
point. One indication of the hegemony of genetic essentialism is the 
difficulty we have imagining a different story to replace it. What 
follows is an effort to tell a different story. 
Early, single-celled organisms reproduced by mitosis, which turns 
one cell into two “daughter” cells.33 In comparison to this 
straightforward process, sexual reproduction presents a puzzle for 
evolutionary biologists. From the female perspective, sexual 
reproduction is quite costly, since it means only half of one’s offspring 
can themselves reproduce.34  From the male perspective, on the other 
hand, sexual reproduction is a way to pass on genes without doing the 
work required to produce an entire new organism. 
Although the male strategy could be described as exploitive it has 
some advantages for the female organisms as well. One advantage was 
that sexual reproduction shuffled the gene pool. Rather than each 
organism reproducing itself identically, with occasional mutations, 
genes would be traded in every generation, allowing for faster, more 
efficient evolution to adapt to the environment.35 At the same time, 
the competitive pressure of sexual selection could help eliminate 
disadvantageous mutations more quickly.36 
One could look at this process from the perspective of either sex; 
traditional, patriarchal ideologies effectively adopt the perspective of 
the sperm. They trace reproduction through the male line and see 
women as vehicles through whom genes are passed. As an alternative, 
we could trace through the female line and regard men as useful 
vehicles for women to swap genes with each other. 
On this view, a woman giving birth is like a cell dividing, with the 
difference that humans, more complex than single-cell organisms, 
collect some foreign DNA to mix in before dividing. In addition, 
because humans are so much bigger than single-cell organisms, the 
process results not in two daughters but in a parent and a child. The 
 
33. Strictly speaking, mitosis refers to “the division of a single nucleus into 
two genetically identical daughter nuclei.” NEIL A. CAMPBELL ET AL., 
BIOLOGY: CONCEPTS AND  CONNECTIONS G-17 (6th ed. 2009). It is one 
stage of the overall process of binary fission, which produces the 
complete daughter cells. Id. at 127. 
34. Carl Zimmer, On the Origin of Sexual Reproduction, 324 SCIENCE 1254, 
1254 (2009). This phenomenon is known as the “twofold cost of sex.” Id. 
35. Zimmer, supra note 34, at 1256.  
36. Alyson J. Lumly et al., Sexual Selection Protects Against Extinction, 
522 NATURE 470 (2015). 
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process, however, can still be seen less as one individual creating 
another but as one individual becoming two. 
This story suggests a different answer to the question, Which 
came first, the parent or the child? Indeed, it suggests a different 
interpretation of the question, especially the word child. As noted 
above, Byrn & Ives treat child as referring to a young human being. 
In my story, child is the gender-neutral form of son or daughter, as in 
daughter cell. As with the word parent, a relationship with another 
person is inherent in the word child. To ask which came first is thus a 
contradiction: the parent and the child can exist only in relation to 
each other; thus, they come into being simultaneously. 
While Byrn & Ives say the child is born and then assigned legal 
parents, my model says the child and the initial parent are created 
simultaneously, over the course of nine months of pregnancy, followed 
by further legal assignments. Rather than envisioning a juridical 
person who comes into being and then is assigned legal parents by the 
state, we could see these two steps as simultaneous. This way, the 
born child is never without a legal parent. The act of birth both 
creates the child as a legal person and creates the formerly pregnant 
woman as the child’s mother. Birth transforms a single legal person 
into two legal people, a parent and a child. 
What might we gain by entertaining this alternative to genetic 
essentialism? First, we would move away from the notion that the 
embryo is a distinct individual from the time of conception and 
perhaps move toward recognizing the truth of Mary Anne Warren’s 
observation, “There is room for only one person with full and equal 
rights inside a single human skin.”37 This woman-centered account of 
reproduction recognizes that the embryo gradually transforms from 
self to other and thus the bankruptcy of maternal-fetal conflict as a 
principle in moral reasoning. At the same time, it recognizes that the 
process of one person dividing into two people has significance beyond 
the contribution of initial genetic material. Gestation and birth 
provide an additional, and to some extent independent, basis for 
women to claim parental rights to children. 
This sort of talk about gestation as a basis for claiming parental 
rights tends to raise feminist concerns about stereotyping women as 
mothers.38 Genetic essentialism is attractive to modern sensibilities in 
 
37. Mary Anne Warren, The Moral Significance of Birth, 4 HYPATIA 47, 63 
(1989). 
38. See Dara E. Purvis, The Origin of Parental Rights: Labor, Intent, and 
Fathers, 41 F.S.U. L. REV. 645, 688–92 (2014) (discussing feminist 
concerns about the “new maternalism” in the context of an argument 
for a labor and intent theory of parental rights) (citing Naomi Mezey & 
Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Against the New Maternalism, 18 MICH. J. 
GENDER & L. 229 (2012)). 
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part because of its superficial sex parity: it seems to avoid suggesting 
that women are more closely or inherently bound up with children 
than are men. It is worth noting, however, that crediting one sex with 
a greater reproductive role does not in fact lead inexorably to that 
sex’s subordination, or even to that sex being assigned more 
responsibility for child rearing. For most of western history, men have 
claimed a greater, more important role in the creation of offspring 
than they in fact play, and their historical claims provide the 
foundation for genetic essentialism. Somehow, none of this led 
Erasmus Darwin, or anyone else at the time, to suggest that men 
ought to change a few more diapers. Either story about reproduction 
can be used to rationalize sex-based subordination, and it is the 
genetic essentialist story that demonstrably traces its roots to 
patriarchal ideology. 
Still, it is true that a downside to my story about reproduction is 
that it can be taken to suggest that gestation creates a unique bond 
between mother and child that is superior to other kinds of 
parenthood. That is why I offer it as a counterweight to genetic 
essentialism rather than as a replacement for all other paths to 
parenthood. If I were in charge of the rules for establishing 
parenthood, a child’s birth mother would be her initial, automatic 
parent.39 The mother could maintain that status on her own, 
relinquish it through adoption, or invite others to join her by forming 
a parental relationship with the child; and certainly, the other genetic 
parent would have a special claim to do so.40 Under this system, the 
child is assured of a parent immediately upon birth, but that parent 
remains free to choose among a variety of possible family forms; the 
system thus avoids the heteronormativity of genetic essentialism. 
When the birth mother brings in additional parents, they attain 
legal parenthood through doctrines such as the biology-plus-
relationship test for genetic fathers and second-parent adoption or de 
facto parenthood for non-biological parents.41 All of these paths 
 
39. Cf. E. Gary Spitko, The Constitutional Function of Biological Paternity: 
Evidence of the Biological Mother’s Consent to the Biological Father’s 
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involve a commitment to providing care for the child that is loosely 
comparable to gestation. I do not claim that the birth mother is 
uniquely able to parent the child. Rather, my claim is that by the 
time of birth she, and only she, has provided the sort of parental care 
that in other contexts serves to establish legal parenthood. She should 
therefore be recognized as the initial legal parent. I do not claim that 
becoming a parent by giving birth is “worth” more than other paths, 
but I do think we need to remember that it also is not less. 
One feature that gestational parenthood shares with all these 
other paths to parenthood—and genetic essentialism lacks—is the 
particularity of the relationship between the parent and child. 
Relationship-based paths to parenthood are unavoidably particular, 
concrete, and personal. That is, gestational parenthood is not an 
abstract connection to the idea of a child, or even the idea of a child 
who shares one’s genes. That is why, for example, I believe the claims 
of a birth mother outweigh the claims of other prospective parents to 
whom she may have “signed over” the child before the birth. The 
pain of wanting and expecting a child, only to be denied at the last 
moment, can be severe, but it is still founded on desire for “a child” 
that has only an abstract relationship to attachment to “this child.” 
To illustrate what I mean by an individuated relationship, 
consider the case of Fasano v. Perry-Rodgers.42 Fasano involved two 
couples who were both undergoing in vitro fertilization at the same 
clinic. Donna Fasano successfully became pregnant; Deborah Perry-
Rogers did not. However, it turned out that Fasano had mistakenly 
been given some of the Perry-Rogerses’ embryos. When she gave birth 
to two boys, one was genetically related to her and her husband while 
the other was the genetic son of the Perry-Rogerses. The case 
presented the question of how to determine parenthood in pure form, 
since unlike in surrogacy cases there was no contract, and Fasano had 
never agreed to gestate a child for anyone else. After a bitter custody 
battle, the court declared that each boy was the legal child of his 
genetic parents, with no rights to visitation or other legal status for 
the other couple.43 Despite rhetorically claiming that genetics were not 
determinative, the court reasoned in the register of genetic 
essentialism that Fasano’s “nominal parenthood” of the second child 
should have been corrected “before the development of a parental 
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relationship,” which the court assumed could only have happened 
after the birth.44 
One interesting feature of Fasano is that it provides an 
opportunity to test some intuitions about how we think about the 
children in these disputes. Consider, for example, that the rule the 
court adopted would presumably have applied even if there had been 
only one child, one who was genetically linked to the Perry-Rogerses. 
Many people feel at least a twinge of relief that, in the actual case, 
Fasano gave birth to “twins.” Despite the tragic circumstances, at 
least she ended up with a baby, as did the Perry-Rogerses. For some 
people, the fact that there were two babies tilts the equities against 
the Fasanos. It seems selfish for them to have tried to keep both. For 
once, King Solomon didn’t have to split the baby, because there were 
enough to go around. This seemingly happy outcome may even have 
helped the court reach the conclusion that it did. 
This common reaction to the facts of Fasano is a good indication 
that some part of us views babies as fungible commodities. Most 
parents of multiple children insist that their children are not 
interchangeable in their hearts. The loss of a child is not diminished 
by the consolation that one still has one left. The parent of multiple 
children has not divided her love into pieces, safely storing each in a 
separate basket to spread the risk of loss.45 Why would we expect 
Donna Fasano to feel differently? I think part of the answer is that we 
too readily discount the parental relationship formed through 
gestation. Genetic essentialism elevated the Perry-Rogerses abstract 
desire for a child of their genes above the concrete, blood and flesh 
relationship between the child and Fasano. 
Fasano, then, illustrates what is lost when parenthood is defined 
through the lens of genetic essentialism, an ideology that places 
ownership and control of one’s genes above the more tangible and 
emotion-based ties that arise from a parent’s direct, physical 
caretaking for a child, including through gestation. Genetic 
essentialism does not flow from historically recent scientific discoveries 
about reproduction. Rather, it is the modern face of a male 
supremacist ideology that predates and has merely adapted to the 
current state of our knowledge of biology. While genetic connections 
will likely always be meaningful to parents and children alike, they 
need not be the sine qua non of parenthood. 
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